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This paper compares the welfare implications of two widely used pricing
assumptions in the New-Keynesian literature: Calvo-pricing vs. Rotemberg-
pricing. We show that despite the strong similarities between the two assump-
tions to a ﬁrst order of approximation, in general they might entail diﬀerent
welfare costs at higher order of approximation. In the special case of non-
distorted steady state, the two pricing assumptions imply identical welfare
losses to a second order of approximation.
Keywords: Calvo price adjustment; Rotemberg price adjustment; welfare;
inﬂation; second-order approximation.
JEL classiﬁcation: E3,       E5.
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Most current dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models assume
that prices (and/or wages) are sticky in nominal terms: i.e. they are not
readjusted to the eﬃcient level in each period. Under sticky prices, and in the
face of exogenous shocks, there will generally be a gap between the eﬃcient
allocation of resources and the actual equilibrium allocation: e.g. too many or
too few goods will be consumed and too many or too few hours will be worked.
In general, it is not clear to which extent the welfare cost of price stickiness
depends on the particular mechanism governing the price adjustments. In
particular, the current macroeconomic literature has focused on a number of
pricing mechanisms, of which the most common are Calvo price adjustments
(Calvo, 1983) and Rotemberg price adjustments (Rotemberg, 1982).
This paper examines the welfare implications of these assumptions in the
case when the steady state is ineﬃcient. The main result is that the two as-
sumptions give diﬀerent results, with the tendency for Calvo to produce larger
losses. As has been shown before, we conﬁrm that in the special case when
the steady state is eﬃcient, the two assumptions produce identical results.
The mechanism proposed by Calvo assumes that each ﬁrm can re-set the
price of its produce only at random intervals of time. This will make demand
shift from one good to the other in a way that does not fully reﬂect the
relative cost of production of the two goods. In other words, shocks will bring
about a distribution of prices of goods that does not reﬂect the underlying
marginal costs. Inﬂation, in this case, will be socially costly because it will
be accompanied by an ineﬃcient price dispersion.
The other pricing mechanism, proposed by Rotemberg, assumes that chang-
ing prices entails a real cost (e.g. in terms of goods or hours worked). In this
case ﬁrms that produce at the same cost will set the same price, although this
will not typically coincide with the eﬃcient price. Shocks, therefore, will not
produce an ineﬃcient dispersion of prices. Instead, shocks will produce an
additional consumption of scarce resources, which in turn will reduce social
welfare.
One interesting feature of these two pricing mechanisms is that, to a ﬁrst
order of approximation, they yield the same set of dynamic equations: i.e.
an identical Phillips curve. Most of the DSGE models that rely on these
assumptions are estimated only up to the ﬁrst order of approximation so that
the two assumptions would be observationally equivalent.
Nevertheless, when the estimated DSGE models are used for welfare anal-
ysis (e.g. to assessing the welfare cost of alternative policies), the two pricing
assumption might produce diﬀerent results. So far, the literature has not
shown exactly to which extent, and in which cases, the two pricing assump-
tions result in diﬀerent welfare costs. Nistic` o (2007) has shown that the two
pricing assumptions imply identical welfare costs in a model with an eﬃcient
steady state (i.e. when eﬃciency is reached through subsidies to monopolistic
ﬁrms). In this paper we show that this result holds only in that special case.
In general, if the steady state is ineﬃcient, the two pricing assumptions can
5
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tively important will very likely depend on the other features of the model
and in particular on the sources of shocks. Therefore, the results of our pa-
per suggest that the particular pricing mechanism adopted in macroeconomic
models could aﬀect the derived policy prescriptions in important ways.
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Recently, a growing literature has dealt with the derivation of optimal policies
in New-Keynesian models1. Most of this literature assumes that prices ad-
just at random intervals of time in a staggered fashion, following the pricing
mechanism introduced by Calvo (1983) and Yun (1996). One of the alter-
native pricing assumptions widely discussed in the literature postulates that
prices are adjusted only slowly to their optimal level in an identical way by
all ﬁrms. Under this assumption, adjusting prices entails convex costs, as
described by Rotemberg (1982).2
To a ﬁrst order of approximation the two pricing assumptions are equiv-
alent. Furthermore, in a recent paper, Nistic` o (2007) shows that the two
pricing assumptions (henceforth Calvo-pricing and Rotemberg-pricing) entail
the same welfare losses when the steady state is eﬃcient. Our paper shows
that when the economy is allowed to ﬂuctuate around an ineﬃcient steady
state, Calvo-pricing entails larger costs, for a given identical ﬁrst order repre-
sentation. Calvo-pricing implies a diﬀerent degree of curvature of the economy
than Rotemberg-pricing. By the Jensen-inequality, this implies that the ex-
pected value of the endogenous variables in the two models might diﬀer. When
the steady state of the economy is eﬃcient, the linear term of the approxi-
mated welfare function drops out reducing the welfare measure to a function
of quadratic terms only. On the contrary, when the steady state is ineﬃ-
cient, the linear term remains in the welfare function so that the diﬀerent
non-linearities are reﬂected in diﬀerent expected levels of welfare.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. First we describe the model
used in the paper. In Section 3 we derive the ﬁrst order representation of
the economy under the two pricing assumptions. In Section 4 we derive the
welfare measures and compare the two models. A ﬁnal Section concludes the
paper.
2 The Model
We use a very simple closed-economy dynamic stochastic general equilibrium
(DSGE) model. This consists of a representative household purchasing a
basket of diﬀerentiated goods and supplying homogeneous labor services. The
diﬀerentiated goods are supplied by monopolistically competitive ﬁrms and
produced using only labor services. Uncertainty is introduced via random
ﬂuctuations in labor productivity and in the subsidies paid to the ﬁrms. We
introduce the latter shock as a source of ineﬃcient ﬂuctuations. The model
is closed by assumptions regarding the decisions of the monetary authority
concerning the short-run nominal interest rate.
We brieﬂy discuss these assumptions in turn.
1See Woodford (2003) and the references cited therein.
2See for example Schmitt-Groh´ e and Uribe (2004).
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There is a continuum of identical households of unit mass. The preferences
of the household are modelled as time-separable CRRA functions of the con-
sumption basket (C) and of hours (l). Money (M) is introduced only for
completeness, although it does not play any role in our discussion.











































where Bt is a nominal bond in zero net supply, Pt is the aggregate price
level, Rt is the short-run nominal interest rate paid on bonds, Wt is the
nominal wage rate, Πt is the share of proﬁts rebated by the ﬁrms to the
households and Tt is a transfer such that Mt+1 − Mt = Tt. The ﬁrst order
conditions with respect to Ct,Bt and lt are
C
−γ










where λt is the Lagrange’s multiplier in the household maximization problem.


















where p(i) is the price of the i-th good.3
2.2 Firms
There is a continuum of monopolistically competitive ﬁrms of unit mass. Each
ﬁrm produces a diﬀerentiated good. Each ﬁrm sets prices according to either
the Calvo-pricing assumption or the Rotemberg-pricing assumption. We dis-
cuss the two pricing assumptions in the following subsections.
3From now on we drop the i-th index except for integrations.
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where TC denotes total costs of production, ¯ Rs,t = βs−t λs+1
λs is the house-
hold nominal discount factor, εt is an AR(1) productivity shock and ωt is a
stochastic subsidy to ﬁrms.
The optimal price reduces to
pt
Pt

















where mct is the real marginal cost and πt ≡ Pt
Pt−1 .
2.2.2 Market clearing
Total demand for goods and labour must be equal to total supply of goods












t = (1 − ξ) ¯ p−θ
t + ξ (πt)
θ P⋆
t−1 (6)
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pt while a fraction ξ on average sets the price Pt−1, equation (5) gives
1 =
"







2.2.3 The Firms’ problem under Rotemberg price setting






























After noting that all ﬁrms set the same price, so that pt = Pt the ﬁrst
order condition is







symmetry also implies that





Finally we can rewrite






2.3 Monetary policy rule
The model can be closed by assumptions concerning the the monetary policy.






3 First order approximation Phillips curves
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(1 − ξβ )(1 − ξ)
ξ
f mct −
(1 − ξβ )(1 − ξ)
ξ
e ωt + Etβe πt+1 (10)
Under Rotemberg-pricing to a ﬁrst order of approximation the Phillips
curve reduces to
e πt =
ω (θ − 1)
φ
f mct +
ω (θ − 1)
φ
e ωt + Etβe πt+1 (11)
where e x = xt−x
x and where a variable without subscript denotes its steady-
state value.
Therefor the two models are identical up to the coeﬃcient on the marginal
cost and on the cost-push shock.
Imposing that φ =
ω(θ−1)ξ
(1−ξ)(1−ξ β) yields the same ﬁrst-order dynamics in both
models.
4 Welfare
Although the two models can be reduced to the same ﬁrst-order representa-
tion, the welfare implications might diﬀer. The following section derives the
welfare function under the two speciﬁcations. Notice that from here on we
denote b xt = xt − x.
4.1 Welfare in the Calvo model
Under Calvo pricing the aggregate welfare function, conditional on informa-


















A second order Taylor approximation of the welfare function yields










where νt is a vector containing the exogenous stochastic variables and
where t.i.p. collects the terms independent of policy (here ﬁrst and second
moments of the preference shock).
Noting that aggregate labor, adjusted for productivity, is identical to ag-
gregate output we have that (henceforth omitting the error term for simplicity)
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t is
constant at its steady-state value when computed to a ﬁrst order of approxi-
mation, so that the cross-product term does not appear in the expansion.















t + lς b εtb lt − C lς ω(θ − 1)
θ
b P⋆
t + t.i.p. (16)
4.2 Welfare in the Rotemberg model
Under Rotemberg-pricing, equation (14) remain unchanged. What varies is
equation (15). A second order expansion of equation (9) yields
































t + t.i.p. (18)
4.3 Comparison under an eﬃcient steady-state
We have seen that the two models are identical to a ﬁrst order of approxima-
tion. Under the assumption
ω(θ−1)
θ = 1 we have that C = l = 1 so that the
diﬀerence between the two measure of welfare just derived reduces to
∆W ≡ c WCalvo






t − b P⋆
t (19)
where, as shown in the Appendix
b P⋆















































where we have used the fact that, under the current assumptions, φ =
ω(θ−1)ξ
(1−ξ)(1−ξ β). Since we have assumed that ω = θ
θ−1 we can conclude that, the
two pricing assumption yield identical welfare levels, conditional on b P⋆
t0−1 = 0.
Notice that, from an unconditional-welfare perspective the last term in







Therefore, using an unconditional perspective, Calvo-pricing would result
in larger welfare losses than Rotemberg-pricing.
4.4 Comparison under an ineﬃcient steady-state







































This expression shows that the two pricing assumptions would produce
the same level of welfare if and only if
￿
b CCalvo










In the next section we solve the model numerically to show that condition
(25) does not hold in general.
4.4.1 Numerical example
Solving for the welfare gap analytically would be too cumbersome. In this
subsection we provide instead a numerical example of the welfare gap when
the steady state is ineﬃcient.
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fare gap while the second is the unconditional welfare gap. For this exercise
we assumed β = 0.99, θ = 6, γ = 2, ς = 2, ξ = 0.5. As for the policy rule, we
assume that the policy rate reacts only to current inﬂation with a coeﬃcient
of 1.5. We consider two shocks separately: a productivity shock and a shock
to the subsidy to ﬁrms. These two shocks are intended to represent eﬃcient
shocks (no inﬂation-output trade oﬀ is produced) and ineﬃcient shocks (an
inﬂation-output trade-oﬀ is produced), respectively. Both shocks are assumed
to be AR(1) with an auto-correlation coeﬃcient of 0.9 and a standard devia-
tion of 1. The results are presented in Table 1.4 The values are expressed in
welfare units.




t=t0 βt−t0∆W = -20.86 -5.22
E
P∞
t=t0 βt−t0∆W = -22.51 -5.66
Looking more in details at the sources of these gaps we can see that ex-
pected consumption under Calvo-pricing is lower than expected consumption
under Rotemberg-pricing. This consumption gap adds to the larger infeﬃ-
ciency wedge produced by inﬂation.
5 Conclusion
This paper has shown that two widespread assumptions in the current New-
Keynesian literature concerning price adjustments can entail diﬀerent welfare
losses when the deterministic steady state of the economy is ineﬃcient. The
Calvo-pricing assumption implies a diﬀerent curvature of the economy than
the Rotemberg-pricing assumption. By Jensen-inequality, this implies that
the expected value of the endogenous variables would, in general, diﬀer across
the two pricing mechanisms. Consequently, welfare is diﬀerent across the two
pricing assumptions.
4The results are obtained with DYNARE (version 4). The conditional mean is obtained iterating
on the ﬁrst- and second-order accurate state-space solution produced by DYNARE.
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6 Proof that b P ⋆ = 0 + O
￿
 ν 2￿
A second order expansion of (6) yields
b P⋆
t = ξ b P⋆
t−1 + θ
￿

















θ(θ − 1)b π2
t + θb πt b P⋆
t−1
￿





(1 − θ)b ¯ pt −
1
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By combining (26) with (27) we see that to a second order of approxi-
mation b P⋆





. In particular by replacing the last expres-
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